Introduction
Despite a recent upsurge in popularity, concerns regarding budget transparency have a long tradition. The establishment of representative democracies throughout the Western world brought with it a resistance to the secrecy that had previously been the norm in governmental accounting. At the time, budget transparency was closely linked to notions of executive accountability and principles of clarity in budgeting.
However, in recent decades the term has been widely adopted by policy makers and popular media, and its meaning has evolved. Budget transparency is not just an element of governmental accountability to Parliament, but rather a tool for facilitating a relationship between public budgeting and market requirements, civil society demands and citizen participation.
Budget transparency is particularly important in local government. Globalization has given rise to a greater recognition of the role of local government, demonstrated by a widespread resort to the subsidiary principle and a growing municipal participation in public policies. The strengthening of local governments along with substantial changes in the way those governments operate has kindled the interest of stakeholders in knowing what governments do, how and at what price. Fairly often, international organizations involved in promoting budget transparency consider local governments to be ideal for testing new systems or arrangements before they are implemented at higher levels.
However, available empirical research on budget transparency tends to focus on national or regional governments. Moreover, studies generally rely on a few crude indicators or survey data from dichotomous-item questionnaires, often extracted from instruments designed for other purposes. Aimed at filling this gap, this paper presents a Likert-type survey questionnaire to measure budget transparency in municipalities. The use of a Likert scale 1 promotes content validity 2 and discreteness with a limited number of survey items. Rather than focusing on the existence of formal safeguards as evidence 1 In this article, the word -scale‖ usually refers to -an instrument made up of multiple items that have a relationship to each other as well as to the concept of interest [budget transparency, in our case]‖ (Colton and Covert 2007: 249) . A Likert scale is a scale composed of Likert-type items, as we explain in subsection 3.1. Although there are precedents for using Likert-type items in measuring budget transparency at the national level (Lavielle, Pérez and Hofbauer 2003; Pérez 2005) , leading studies on determinants of budget transparency have tended to rely on the above-mentioned kinds of data.
2 According to Colton and Covert (2007: 68) , content validity is the degree to which an instrument is representative of the topic and process being investigated. of budget transparency, Likert scales make it possible to analyze the degree to which municipal practices and/or behaviors satisfy certain transparency-related criteria. Based on the answers to this survey by financial comptrollers from 33 Galician municipalities, we perform an empirical analysis on the determinants of transparency.
The paper is organized as follows: section 2 presents the definition, scope, and international standards for budget transparency. Relevant empirical studies on the determinants of budget transparency are also reviewed. Section 3 presents our survey and evaluates its consistency. Both the descriptive analysis and econometrics are contained in section three. Section 4 concludes.
Approach to Budget Transparency: Definition, Scope, and Determinants.
The notion of transparency is far from clear. According to Hood (2006: 3), -like many other notions of a quasi-religious nature, transparency is more often preached than practised, more often invoked than defined, and indeed might ironically be said to be mystic in essence, at least to some extent‖. As a general governmental requirement, transparency goes beyond mere access to information, demanding that information prove understandable to external stakeholders. However, the editors' note of the OECD Best Practices for Budget Transparency does not state this requirement specifically when it defines transparency as -openness about policy intentions, formulation and implementation‖, and budget transparency as -the full disclosure of all relevant fiscal information in a timely and systematic manner‖ (OECD 2001: 7) . The OECD requires preparation of budget reports, disclosure of specific data, and the establishment of procedures to ensure integrity (Table 1) . (iii) public availability of information, and (iv) assurance of integrity. The first of these pillars can be considered beyond the scope of the OECD Best Practices, since that pillar focuses on the establishment of a clear distinction between public corporations, the private sector and the government. This is not the case with the last three pillars, which maintain multiple similarities with the OECD Best Practices, but go further in several respects 4 . We will thus limit the scope of budget transparency to the standards outlined 3 For instance: i) inclusion of comparative and non-financial information, ii) explanation of deviations, iii) consistency in format between the budget and the final report, iv) issuing of monthly reports within four weeks, and v) audit and issuing of the year-end report within of six months. 4 The second pillar also requires -clear mechanisms for the coordination and management of budgetary and extra-budgetary activities within the overall fiscal policy framework‖. The third and fourth pillars incorporate innovative provisions such as:
i) publication of a periodic report on long-term public finances; ii) openness in purchase and sale of public assets; iii) mechanisms to monitor follow-up actions recommended by the national auditor;
in the last three pillars of the IMF Code, viewed as an updated and less detailed version of the OECD Best Practices.
Transparency in public financial management is also receiving increased attention in public administration, political science and economics research. Empirical research focuses primarily on testing the benefits of fiscal transparency. This is the case of the work by focused on the effects of fiscal transparency on the accumulation of public debt in OECD countries. When dealing with endogeneity problems of transparency as regressor, they also find that measures of political competition, presidential system and common law variables do well in explaining variation in transparency, whereas debt level has no statistically significant effect 5 .
A more direct analysis of transparency determinants is presented in Alt, Lassen and Rose (2006) . Based on work by Hanssen (2004) , the authors hypothesize that budgeting practices will be more transparent in systems marked by high political competition. Jarmuzek (2006) . Although he does not detail the effects of his instrumental variables on fiscal transparency, the variables used in the model include a political competition index (i.e. past turnover), the rule of law, and the media freedom index compiled by the Freedom House.
6 The authors base this hypothesis on model implications from Ferejohn's (1999 Among the control variables, electoral participation promotes fiscal transparency, while population negatively affects transparency, but only for the large municipalities (defined as those with more than 5,000 inhabitants).
Empirical Analysis

3.1.Questionnaire design and Municipal Governments Surveyed
To measure budget transparency in Galician municipalities, we designed a survey questionnaire composed of fifteen items based on the second, third and fourth pillars of the IMF's revised Code of Good Practices on Fiscal Transparency (2007).
Items one through five correspond to the second pillar (open budget processes), items
six through ten to the third (public availability of information), and items eleven through fifteen to the fourth pillar (assurances of integrity). As indicated above, adherence to the standards outlined in the first pillar of the IMF Code was not measured given that its content was not covered by the OECD Best Practices for Budget Transparency, used here as a reference to define the scope of budget transparency.
Moreover, the most of the contents of the first pillar are beyond the municipalities' control. Definition of roles and competences along with a legal framework for public management are determined by basic national legislation, and are not applied at municipalities' discretion. 
INSTRUCTIONS:
Please indicate your level of agreement with the following statements as they pertain to your municipality: 5 indicates strong agreement, 4 agreement, 3 neither agree nor disagree, 2 disagreement and 1 strong disagreement.
Full disagree The questionnaire items are not only based on the IMF Code but on our own practical knowledge about budgetary processes at the local level of government. In particular, we tried to construct items to go beyond nominal fiscal transparency to measure effective transparency, as well (Heald 2003 (Heald , 2006 . The item selection was aimed at covering all the areas of budget content and budgetary process, but avoiding redundancy. To start, we constructed a list of 50 items which touched on the three pillars of interest within the IMF Code. In a second step, the number of items reduced to 15 in order that the questionnaire not be perceived as too time-consuming. The questions were based on a Likert (1932) scale, i.e., a summative scale consisting of Likert-type items. These items are designed as statements with which the respondents express their agreement or disagreement. We use numbers from 1 to 5 instead of the common wording: strongly disagree, disagree, no opinion, agree, and strongly agree.
The survey questionnaire was sent to 40 Galician municipalities. Responses from 35 were received, but two had to be discarded due to various shortcomings. The 33 municipalities included in the final sample are listed by alphabetical order in Table 3 .
The population is over 50,000 in three municipalities (13, 24, and 28) , between 20,001 and 50,000 in eight municipalities (1, 3, 10, 14, 23, 25, 27, and 33) , between 10,001 and 20,000 in twelve (2, 5, 6, 9, 15, 17, 18, 22, 29, 30, 31, and 32) , between 5,001 and 10,000 in seven (7, 12, 16, 19, 20, 21 , and 26) and below 5,000 in the remaining three municipalities (4, 8, and 11) . In all cases, the survey was answered by the public officials responsible for pre-auditing transactions and/or accounting. Those officials were selected by means of a national competitive examination, and they have a deep knowledge of financial and fiscal laws as well as the budgetary reality of their municipalities. 
Dimensionality and internal consistency issues
The most common approach to the analysis of internal consistency of a social research instrument is an item analysis which considers both item-total correlation and inter-correlation among the items (Colton and Covert 2007: 72, 265-267) . Item analyses and Cronbach's (1951) alpha coefficients are optimal tools for the assessment of internal consistency in a unidimensional scale with items measuring different substantive areas within a single concept.
Thus, in order to determine whether ITA is optimal, we should begin by using one of the many factor-analytic techniques currently available to make sure that there are no large departures from unidimensionality (Cortina 1993: 103) . Taking into account the low number of observations, several principal component analysis tests confirmed that the instrument effectively was mainly unidimensional 7 .
In a second step, we evaluate internal consistency by examining inter-item correlations, item-total correlations and Cronbach's alpha. This classical approach was used for the following reasons: i) it is easily computable in standard statistical packages;
ii) it compensates for the limited sample size by providing a synthetic measure based on all correlation matrix elements; and iii) as multidimensionality would increase the underestimating bias of Cronbach's α, a high α is a reliable indicator of internal consistency 8 .
Prior to inter-item correlation analysis, the Kolgomorov-Smirnov test on normality of data was performed. According to results, the hypothesis of normal distribution should not be rejected (p-value<0.05). Thus, the relationships among items can be measured through a Pearson correlation coefficient 9 , as shown in Table 4 .
7 Plotting the magnitude of the successive eigenvalues and applying the Cattell's (1966) Scree test, a sharp drop in eigenvalues from component one is observed.
8 Within a hierarchical factor model framework, Zinbarg et al. (2005) demonstrates that α underestimates reliability in the first three of four theoretical scenarios: (1) unidimensional scales with unequal general factor loadings, (2) multidimensional scales with equal general factor loadings, and (3) multidimensional scales with unequal general factor loadings. Only in the fourth case, unidimensional scales with equal general factor loadings -i.e., essential tau equivalence-, is α as appropriate as ω to measure reliability. Vehkalahti, Puntanen and Tarkkonen (2006: 2) also use alpha's underestimating bias to justify the search for and proposal of a new estimator suggesting that this estimator, called Tarkkonen's rho, provides a better alternative for Cronbach's α.
9 According Revelle (2010: 216) , the correlations associated with an ordinal scale are not Pearson's but Spearman's . However, Garson (2008) explains that ordinality in Likert scales refers only to an ordinal relationship of values within a single item: Likert response values are ordinal within any given item but sets of Likert items are not necessarily ordinal with respect to each other, and they can be used to form indexes. In order to obtain a global appraisal of internal consistency, mean inter-item correlation and an alpha coefficient for the total score were computed, with resulting values of 0.27 and 0.85, respectively 10 . This alpha clearly satisfies the widely held rule of thumb proposed by Nunnaly (1978) , that an alpha of 0.7 or higher indicates internal 10 When calculated from the correlation matrix (Table 4) , a standardized alpha of 0.849 is obtainedthe same could be calculated from the covariance matrix by standardizing and summing all items in the scale. In our case, the raw alpha provided by SPSS (0.850) is practically equal to the standardized alpha. In Table 5 , raw alphas from SPSS are reported.
consistency. Indeed, such α is within the ideal range between the consistency threshold (0.8) and the redundancy threshold (0.9) 11 .
The next step is to examine the consistency of each item with the scale as a whole, so we can identify any items which do not represent the latent variable being measured (budget transparency). The key results are in the last two columns of Table 5 .
The penultimate column indicates the correlation between each item and the average of the other items, while the last column reveals what the consistency of our scale would be if we would delete the given item (De Coster 2004: 47) . If an item has a low correlation with total and its deletion causes a considerable increase in the alpha score, the item is suspected of inconsistency. In our case, items 8 and 5 are the least correlated with total and the only ones whose deletion causes an increase in α. Although these increases are not considerable, the correlation of item 8 with the average of the other items is lower than the normal rule of thumb cited by Steiner and Norman (1995) , of at least 0.20. It suggests that item 8 is not reflecting only budget transparency but also financial management sophistication. Indeed, we expected a peculiar behavior in this item because most Galician municipalities have not yet developed a performance management approach, but other practical considerations led us to maintain the item.
11 Although the widely-accepted social science criterion is that alpha should be 0.70 or higher for a set of items to be considered a scale, and even a lenient cut-off of 0.60 is common in exploratory research, many researchers require a score of 0.80 for a -good scale‖ (Garson 2008 (Garson , 2010 . On the other hand, a high alpha may also suggest a high level of item redundancy, wherein essentially the same item is rephrased in several different ways (Boyle 1991) . Thus, for example, Fitzpatrick et al. (1998: 23) consider that alpha values should not be higher than 0.9 for scales which are used as research tools to compare groups. A very high α suggests that there is some redundancy among items, and the possibility that the items together are addressing a rather narrow aspect of an attribute. Finally, internal consistency of our three subscales was also evaluated by the alpha coefficient, obtaining the following values: Open Budget Processes (items 1 to 5), 0.649; Public Availability of Information (items 6 to 10), 0.674; and Assurances of Integrity (items 11 to 15), 0.748. While these values are lower than the total alpha for all 15 items together, they can be considered adequate for subscales with a limited number of items. Corrected item-total correlation and alpha if item deleted were also computed for each subscale, in order to examine the consistency of each item with the subscale as a whole. Again, item 8 is the only item whose correlation with the average of the remaining items of its subscale is lower than 0.2. This result is consistent with those of an additional PCA/FA on our subscales, according to which all of the second subscale's items besides item 8 loaded onto a single factor.
Descriptive analysis of the survey results
Respondents' mean scores by item show the distribution reflected in figure 1, with most of the municipalities clustered around the sample mean (2.5778). Insofar as this score is below 3, the average perception resulting from the survey is like a fail grade in budget transparency. Descriptive statistics by item are shown in Table 6 . The elements perceived as more transparent are those covered by items 12 and 14. Both items are proxies for the observance of public procurement regulations and the where X are the item scores, and i varies from 1 to 15.
From this straightforward calculation, we calculate an index score for each municipality, resulting in the following ranking table. Differences in scores among municipalities are significant, with the top-ranked municipality (Lugo) scoring 10% higher than the second-ranked municipality (Monforte de Lemos) which, in turn, scores three times higher than the lowest ranked municipality (Ponteareas). It is equally remarkable that the municipalities ranked lowest for budget transparency are those in the worst economic situation (Santiago, Cambados, Cangas, Ponteareas, Betanzos), as determined by the Galician Supreme Audit Institution.
Econometric analysis of the determinants of budget transparency
Econometric specification and data
In order to disentangle the determinants of budget transparency in local In particular, we detected a high correlation between aging, population size, municipal public expenditure over municipal GDP, and per capita GDP. Youth migrate from backward municipalities in terms of GDP, bringing about both the ageing and reduction of total population. Insofar as local expenditure is partially financed by equalization grants, the public expenditure/GDP ratio tends to be higher in the backward municipalities. Dropping per capita GDP and ageing from the specification substantially reduced multicollinearity among the independent variables. over municipal GDP, per capita debt, and tax pressure), and four represent political features (incumbent's ideology, effective number of political parties, coalition governments, and political participation). Table 9 reports descriptive statistics for both endogenous and exogenous variables. Laakso and Taagapera (1979) it is computed using tbe following formula: The expected sign of the independent variables is the following:
The expected sign is positive. Larger administrative staffs in large municipalities make it easier to meet transparency requirements (Esteller and Polo 2008) 13 .
 U: The expected sign is negative: the worse the economic situation, the stronger the temptation to conceal fiscal stress 14 .
 BAL: The effect of this variable is ambiguous. As explained in section 2, the incumbents would hover between their desires to disengage from adverse fiscal results and to take credit for positive fiscal outcomes (Alt, Lassen and Rose
2006)
15 .
13 Alt, Lassen and Rose (2006) find a non-significant effect. Esteller and Polo (2008) obtain a negative effect, but only for municipalities with over 5,000 inhabitants.
14 LaFaive (2009) detects a negative relationship between unemployment and the transparency of a Michigan's program for economic development. However, Peixoto (2010) finds no correlation between the US states' levels of unemployment and the transparency of their recovery websites. Moreover, Andersen and Nielsen (2010: 28) suggest that the extremely damaging nature of procyclical fiscal policies during recessions may trigger reforms that increase the degree of fiscal transparency. Other studies on transparency also consider unemployment (Alt, Lassen and Skilling 2001; Rosendorff and Vreeland 2009) , but not as a determinant of transparency.
15 In the Alt, Lassen and Rose's (2006) empirical analysis, the resulting sign is positive for imbalance (both surplus and deficit), implying that the greater deficit spending leads to greater fiscal transparency. 16 La Porte, Demchak and Jong (2002) fail to obtain empirical support for their hypothesized positive effect of government size on openness, although in some of their tests the -government size‖ variable does not remain after removing accounting for obvious collinearity. Bastida and Benito (2007: 690-691) observe that the relative size of central government presents a low significant (p-value=0.079) negative relationship (-0.260) with budget transparency. According to the authors, although the study shows that larger central governments are linked to lower levels of transparency, the low significance prevents using the evidence to draw a strong conclusion.
17 Alt, Lassen and Rose (2006) find that per capita general revenues are not significant in most estimates. In Esteller and Polo (2008) taxes are only significant at 10% in a cluster model, with the expected positive sign.
18 Although La Porte, Demchak and Jong (2002) find no empirical support for the hypothesized impact of democracy on web site openness, they appear not include the -voting‖ variable in testing. Esteller and Polo (2008) , however, confirm a positive relationship between electoral participation and fiscal transparency, and Rosendorff and Vreeland (2009) do the same for democracy and transparency. Finally, Bastida and Benito (2007: 690) find no significant correlations between their democratic-level variables and budget transparency, although they suggest that the direction of the relationships supports the notion that greater levels of political and civil liberty, correspond to higher fulfilment of the OECD Best Practices for Budget Transparency.
19 As pointed out in the above mentioned section, Alt, Lassen and Rose's (2006) econometric analysis corroborates this positive relationship when controlling for the effects of debt, fiscal imbalance, and polarization, as well as when using an Arellano-Bond GMM first-difference estimation of their main equations. By contrast, Esteller and Polo (2008) find the variable is not significant, and Bastida and Benito (2007: 692) do not find any relationship between ideology and budget transparency.
 ENPP: Positive. According to Alt, Lassen and Rose (2006) , incumbents will be more likely to increase transparency when leaving office, in order to tie the hands of their successor.
Two basic econometric specifications were estimated. While specification [3] is used to analyze the determinants of the global transparency index (GTI), specification
[4] was constructed using information on the three partial indexes (PTI) corresponding to the subscales defined above. The list of explanatory variables is the same in both cases:
In both expressions X is the set of n socioeconomic variables, W is the set of m fiscal (Table 10 ). In the case of equation [4] , only results obtained from this second step are reported (Table 11) . We also tested the endogeneity of some of the right-hand variables using a graphical display of the cumulative sum (CUSUM) of the recursive residuals associated with a specific ordering of cross-sectional data (de Luna and Johansson 2008 ). In particular we tested the endogeneity of variables BAL, E and D (T is not relevant to the explanation of GTI or PTI j ) by sorting the data with respect to those variables and looking at recursive residuals obtained from the estimates in column 1 of Table 10 . RESET is a general test for the following types of specification errors: Omitted variables, incorrect functional form, and correlation between the exogenous variables and the random term which may be caused by measurement error or simultaneity, among other things. In the case of the global transparency index, five regressors are significant at the 5% level (U, BAL, COAL, LEFT, ENPP) and one is significant at 10% (E is one way to reduce conflict to tolerable levels. the marginal effect of BAL is very small but the standard deviation is large (more than three times the mean). Hence, its effect is also important in some cases.
Econometric methods and results
Equations
Concluding Remarks
From a methodological standpoint, our first conclusion is that relying on subjectivity-laden data from internal sources does not necessarily supposes an overoptimistic bias in transparency scores. Second, results made clear the necessity of a more in-depth examination of the survey questionnaires' dimensionality and internal consistency. Certain features of the budgetary process may be attributes of more than one latent variable, rather than reflecting only budget transparency.
Finally, while some of our empirical results on the determinants of budget transparency confirm previous findings, others point to new relationships. This is the case for the statistical significance of unemployment, the negative relationship between coalitions and transparency, and the positive impact of debt on the first partial transparency index. This last result stands in contrast to the negative effect reported by Alt, Lassen and Rose (2006) and Esteller and Polo (2008) , and the negative influence of deficit on transparency. This contrast could, however, have a suitable explanation.
While debt may have been accumulated during past fiscal stresses and not to be attributable to the current or previous government, deficit supposes a recent and even ongoing fiscal stress. Thus, our results may be suggesting that governments are more prone to enhance transparency when inheriting a heavy fiscal burden (high debt) and enacting sound spending policies (low deficit).
